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Index of Fiscal Decentralisation: Methodology
and Findings
Victoria Curzon Price and Jacques Garello
Abstract
The Index of Fiscal Decentralisation (IFD) could be a very helpful quantitative instrument
while radical changes in European organisation are just now coming. The IFD permits a
comparison between fifteen European countries (including Switzerland). It is based on five
variables indicative of the respective weights of central and local governments: how is allocated
the total amount of fiscal revenues and spending, which level has the power to determine the tax
base, the tax rates and types of taxation, as well as the way they are used, what is the possibility
for taxpayers to control and to take legal proceedings at different levels?
The results make clear that in most of the European countries (except Switzerland) the fiscal
centralisation is high, and that there is wide deviation of the index. So the prospect of a fiscal
harmonisation seems to be very weak in the short term. The paper leads to the concept of “fiscal
coherence”: the worst situation is that of taxation designed and collected at one level, and of
spending at another one. Hence actors in the fiscal system are irresponsible and taxpayers
powerless.
L’indice de décentralisation fiscale est un instrument de mesure particulièrement appréciable
au moment où un changement radical intervient dans l’organisation de l’Europe. Il permet de
comparer quinze pays européens (dont la Suisse). Il est construit à partir de cinq variables
significatives des poids respectifs des administrations centrales et locales : comment se répartit la
masse des recettes et des dépenses, qui détient le pouvoir de décision sur les assiettes, les taux et
les modalités des prélèvements et l’usage qui en est fait, quelles sont les possibilités de contrôle et
de recours des contribuables aux différents niveaux ? Les résultats font apparaître un niveau plutôt
élevé de centralisation dans la plupart des pays (la Suisse étant la seule exception notable), et une
forte dispersion de l’indice.
Les perspectives d’une harmonisation fiscale semblent donc très réduites à court terme.
L’étude débouche sur le concept de « cohérence fiscale » : la pire des situations est celle où les
prélèvem- ents sont décidés à un niveau, et les dépenses à un autre ; les acteurs de la fiscalité sont
alors irresponsables et les contribuables impuissants.
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INDEX OF FISCAL
DECENTRALISATION
METHODOLOGY AND FINDINGS
Victoria Curzon Price° & Jacques Garello°°
1. Introduction
This paper reports on a research project initiated and financed by IREF
(Institut de recherche en économie et ﬁscalité). We begin by explaining what we
hoped to achieve by creating an index of fiscal decentralization.  In a second
section we describe the methodology followed:  the reasons for the selection of the
five variables which were taken into account, and the results of quantitative
estimates for ﬁfteen countries.  With more time and data at our disposal, we could
naturally have pursued this research much further, but even in its current state, we
consider that the results are worth publishing.  We have an interesting sample of
countries and have come across some noteworthy trends.  In a third and
concluding section we offer an interpretation of the results.  The detailed
explanations for scores are collected in two appendices.
2. Why Develop an Index of Fiscal Decentralization?
Debates on the future of European integration usually centre on “what to do
next?”  Deepening or widening?  Or both.  The idea that perhaps we have gone far
enough is not often explored.  One area where it is almost taken for granted that
“Europe must progress” is in taxation.  Ever since the publication of the
PRIMAROLO report1 much effort has been expended on emulating the OECD on
° University of Geneva.
°° University of Aix-Marseille III.
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the need to fight “harmful tax competition”.  The result has been an extended
battle to harmonize withholding taxes on savings and/or to ensure administrative
cooperation between tax authorities, culminating in the adoption of the Savings
Directive in 20032.  Some member states also support the establishment of agreed
minimum corporate tax rates, and the German government has even threatened to
withhold EU regional and cohesion fund aid from Central European countries
which refuse to harmonize their tax systems with those of Western Europe..
Different tax rates across the European single market, not to speak of the single
currency zone covering 12 members, are thought to be distorting.  They are said to
generate inefﬁcient capital and resource ﬂows between member states.
This being the general context, what purpose is served by studying ﬁscal
decentralisation?
 The future of European integration is more uncertain than ever.  It is
now clear that ten new members will join the existing structure (up to and
including the Treaty of Nice) in May 2004.  The outcome is unknown  at the time of
writing.
In any event, many member states are currently emphasizing
decentralisation or devolution  as a better and more democratic form of governing
their own societies, while at the same time supporting moves towards greater
centralisation at the level of the European Union.  This trend is not only
paradoxical.  It needs to be included in any vision of the future of European
integration.  Since this question is absent from the text of the Constitutional Treaty
Project, it is not too late to launch a debate on the issue.
 This is all the more necessary because the current Commission has
pursued a strongly centralizing bias, in particular in relation to taxation (nor is this
the only area) in order to prevent “harmful tax competition”.  However, this
harmonization bias at European level runs against the decentralizing trend at
member-state level.  How much freedom do member states have (or should they
have) to “deconcentrate” their own internal domestic tax arrangements?  How will
greater local tax autonomy at sub-national level impact on the “harmful tax
competition” debate?  Is the Commission on a collision course with the growing
tide of public opinion in favour of more local democracy, especially in fiscal
matters?  Does institutional competition in fiscal matters lead to a “race to the
2 Council-2003. 
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bottom”, as many fear3, or to constraints on the growth of government, as many
hope4?
 Any debate on the future of European integration must also address the
question of ﬁscal federalism within the European Union and with it the question of
subsidiarity.  At present only a small part of the EU budget comes from truly “own
resources” (customs duties), and as trade liberalization progresses, one can assume
that this share will diminish with time.  The remainder comes from a speciﬁed share of
VAT, but this is renewable every six years and subject to intense political debate each
time.  At one moment the question of an independent “European” tax authority will
certainly arise, and with it, the extent to which member states can continue to exercise
their ﬁscal independence.  Euroland members have, after all, already abandoned their
autonomy in matters of monetary and fiscal policy, so fiscal sovereignty logically
seems to follow.  We deﬁnitely need a debate on this question.
 Finally, social policies at the European level are also on the agenda in
any debate on the future of European integration.  It seems natural to most people
that the European proto-federal state should reﬂect the normal social concerns that
determine social policies at member-state level.  However, the question of how
and how much social policy is to be shared between Union and state levels has
yet to be explored.  Again, the question of subsidiarity arises.  Perhaps most social
policies are best decided and delivered at sub-national level, perhaps not.  A
serious debate on this question has yet to take place.
 The European Union is entering a new phase with the accession of 10
new members, which is sure to accentuate competitive pressures at all levels – in
goods and factor markets, naturally, but also at the level of institutions.  Since the
“widening” of the Union has taken place before the “deepening” one can assume
that the pressure for “deepening” will increase, along with the difﬁculty of forging
a consensus among 25 countries.  In the meantime, in the absence of such a
consensus, institutional competition will dominate.  It is therefore of interest to
discover the extent of institutional divergence between EU members in matters of
ﬁscal organization.
The purpose of our current research on the extent, direction and nature of
fiscal decentralisation in different member states of the European Union is to
contribute to various aspects of these issues.
3 According to the « Primolo Report », EU Commission (Commission-1997), “une
concurrence (fiscale) incontrôlée ayant pour enjeu des facteurs mobiles peut rendre les
systèmes ﬁscaux pénalisants pour l’emploi et entraver la réduction méthodique et structurée
de la charge ﬁscale globale.  Elle réduit aussi la marge de manoeuvre pour atteindre d’autres
objectifs communautaires tels que la protection de l’environnement.  De plus, la
concurrence fiscale peut gêner les efforts de réduction des déficits budgétaires …
L’intégration des marchés, si elle ne s’accompagne pas d’une coordination ﬁscale, restreint
de plus en plus la liberté des Etats membres de choisir la structure ﬁscale la plus adaptée… »
(p. 2).
4 For seminal articles on institutional competition see Tiebout-1956 and Hirschman-1981.
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3. Methodology: An index of fiscal decentralisation:
Conceptual structure
In order to assess how various European countries stand with regard to the
question of ﬁscal decentralisation, we have proceeded in two stages.
Stage 1: :Establishing a working deﬁnition of ﬁscal decentralisation;
Stage 2: :Establishing quantitative estimates for various elements of the working
deﬁnition of ﬁscal decentralisation.
Stage 1: A working deﬁnition of ﬁscal decentralisation: ﬁve criteria
Generally speaking, total fiscal decentralisation to local authorities would imply
that taxpayers and their elected representatives possess all powers to raise taxes,
decide on spending programmes and control budgets.  Tax payers would enjoy
appropriate protection under the law, be free to organize ﬁscal referenda and be
free to move their ﬁscal domicile, partially or completely, elsewhere.  Zero ﬁscal
decentralisation, on the other hand, would imply that higher authority (in
principle, Central national government) determine completely, for each local
government agency, types of taxes, tax rates and expenditure programmes; central
government collects and redistributes all tax revenues;  tax payers have no
recourse against tax authorities and cannot alter their tax domicile, partially or
totally.
These extreme situations certainly do not exist today in Western Europe, although
they have in the past5.  Today, reality lies between these two extremes.  We have
tried to discover where, using five variables.  We have detailed studies for 15
European countries, including all the “big” EU members:  Germany, France, Italy,
UK, Spain, most of the Nordic countries, some Central European countries,
Switzerland and Ireland.  
The variables are judged on scores from 0 to 5, with 0 being the most centralized
and 5 the most decentralized.  The issues under considerationed  are:
Variable 1: central/local split in tax revenues
Structure of ﬁscal revenues:  which level of government collects what proportion
of tax?  
5The République des Escartons (in the Briançon area on the Franco-Italian Alpine border)
enjoyed total ﬁscal independence from the King of France from 1450-1791.  The Cantons of
Uri, Schwyz and Unterwald also purchased their judicial and fiscal freedom from the
Hapsburg emperors in the 13th century, and have yet to relinquish them (Martin-1966,
pp. 25-26).  At the other extreme, Lord Acton devotes a whole passage in his History of
Freedom to the fact that in times past ordinary people “were so much material that the
sovereign power consumed for its own purposes”,  before limited government was
“invented” (Acton-1993, pp. 38-39).
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The variable is widely used and easily available.  However, care needs to be taken
to make sure that we are measuring what we want to measure.  Social security
contributions are excluded because they are not taxes (even if, as in Denmark and
the UK, some social goods are partly ﬁnanced out of tax revenues).  Furthermore,
it is important to get this number before transfers between different levels of
government take place.   
This data gives us a first impression of the distribution of tax receipts between
different levels of government.  It runs from 0 (all taxes levied by Central authority)
to 5 (100% of taxes levied by local authorities).  
Table 1: Central/Local split in tax revenues
Rank Central (% revenues) Local (% revenues)
5 0 100
4 20 80
3 40 60
2 60 40
1 80 20
0 100 0
Variable 2: central local tax discretion
How are taxes collected?  Which level of government actually gets the money out
of the tax payer? How much top-down redistribution is there from the centre to
local government?  If there is little redistribution, each level of government stands
on its own feet and is responsible for the outcome.  The system is transparent.  If
there is a lot of redistribution (block grants, automatic funding etc. from the top
down) then this encourages ﬁscal irresponsibility.  Nobody knows or cares where
the money goes to or comes from.  It is reasonable to believe that such fiscal
incoherence would be associated with high levels of taxation.
It is in fact not easy to establish the degree of redistribution of tax revenues
between levels of government.  The OECD itself already adjusts its data according
to whether tax revenues should be attributed to the spending agent as of right,6
and what should be deemed a grant from central to local government.  From our
point of view, it would be better to simply have access to the raw data.  For
example, a centralized branch of the French ﬁsc (the “Trésor public”) collects VAT
6 The OECD puts the question thus: “When a government collects taxes and pays them over
in whole or in part to other governments, it is necessary to determine whether the revenues
should be considered to be those of the collecting government which it distributes to others
as grants, or those of the beneﬁciary governments which the collecting government receives
and passes on only as their agent.”OECD-2002a,  p. 295.  In general, tax revenues are
attributed to non-collecting governments “when they have exercised some influence or
discretion over the setting of the tax or distribution of its proceeds” (ibid.).  
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and redistributes the revenue to all levels of government throughout the country
according to a pre-established key.   Should this be considered Central tax
revenue, or revenue accruing by right to each sub-level of government?  Which is
the agent, which is the principal?  According to the OECD system, this would be
judged as “local government revenue”, while we would prefer to see the full extent
of the vertical distribution.  This is not always possible, but as a second best, we
have tried to establish the share of local tax receipts originating from Central
government.
Table 2: Central/Local tax discretion
Rank
5 All taxes levied and spent at sub-central level
4 Taxes autonomous at each level (little or no inter-regional redistribution)
3 Taxes determined by central authority, redistribution < 20% of total 
2 Taxes determined by central authority, redistribution 20-40% 
1 Taxes determined by central authority, redistribution > 40%
0 Taxes determined centrally, no local discretion 
Variable 3: local discretionary taxing power 
Which level of government exercises the power to determine taxes from a legal
point of view?  How much influence does the citizen/taxpayer have to control
central and/or local government expenditure? Are tax referenda possible? (This
seems to be the ultimate form of taxpayer control over the process of setting taxes,
distant parliamentary control being subject to free-riding, log-rolling, and pork-
barrel/public choice problems of every kind7).
The question in fact goes to the heart of democracy.  Voting on taxes coincides
historically with the birth of democracy, and constitutional limitations on the
powers of the central authority.  The Magna Carta (1215) was inter alia designed
to protect the barons from arbitrary conﬁscation of their property by King John;
the American Revolution started with a tax revolt. 
Fiscal decentralisation implies that the voter/taxpayer is as close as possible to the
political decision-making authority which sets taxes and spends the revenue thus
generated8.  Under a regime of fiscal centralisation, on the other hand, the
7 According to Vaubel (Vaubel-1995, p. 43) “direct democracy (by referendum) is the most
effective way of curbing the inﬂuence of pressure groups”.
8 See Garello-2003: “decision making needs to be local because knowledge of needs and
resources is in large part local”.  Vaubel (Vaubel-1995,  p. 11) emphasizes for his part the fact
that individual preferences differ, and that the demand for “public” goods and the supply of
voluntary transfers depends on many local preferences.
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voter/taxpayer is far from the decision-making authority, even if it is a matter of
supplying and paying for local collective goods; when central authority sets the
spending agenda, “caps” local expenditure or puts limits on local tax rates.  In such
distant centralized régimesregimes, lobbies shift their efforts upwards to the true
decision-taking authority, far removed from the people concerned9.  Decisions
contrary to their interests are thereby easy to take.  On the other hand, if local
authorities possess real fiscal power, it is probable that they respond more
precisely to the preferences of their voters and are less swayed by special interest
groups because voters can spot rent-seekers more easily in a small polity than in a
larger one, and can vote the rent-givers out of ofﬁce.
For all these reasons, it would seem logical that ﬁscal decentralisation should result
in lower overall levels of taxation10. As mentioned above, the ﬁscal referendum at
local level is the ultimate defence against such rent-seeking as might subsist in a
local context.
Table 3: Local discretionary taxing power.
Rank
5 Taxes determined at local level, citizens have the right to call ﬁscal referenda
4 Each level of government is independent of the other(s). Referenda possible
3 Powers of each level set in Constitution according to “European” notion of 
subsidiarity*
2 Non-marginal powers devolved to local or regional levels by central state.  
No referenda
1 Local levels cannot initiate new taxes, marginal changes in rates possible. 
No referenda
0 Local levels have no power to tax.  No referenda
Variable 4: local discretionary spending power 
Who decides what public revenue should be spent on?  Are different levels of
government autonomous, or are tasks set from above?  
9 According to Vaubel  (Vaubel-1995,  p. 43), centralization favours rent-seekers because
lobbies “save transaction costs by lobbying one instead of (N) governments” and ... because
centralisation “raises the cost of political information for the individual consumer and
taxpayer who has to pay the bill”.  One might add that centralization, by concentrating
greater resources in the hands of fewer public ofﬁcials, increases the size of the honey pot
and attracts more lobbies and more effort on their part to secure rents from it.
10 According to Weingast B.R., Shepsle K.A., Johnsen C. (Weingast/Shepsle/Johnsen-1981, p.
643) rent-seeking (“project financing through generalized taxation” which “concentrates the
beneﬁts and spreads the costs”) results in “larger projects and programs than are economically
warranted”.  Therefore, the more rent-seeking there is, the higher the level of taxation.
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This variable tries to establish how much discretion/influence the sub-national
levels of government have in setting their own spending agenda, even if part of
their revenue comes from the central level.   This is a subtle question which cannot
be answered solely by reference to constitutional provisions.  All  sub-national
government authorities spend money which they have not themselves collected
(see variable 2).  The question is which level of government decides on the
expenditure.   Measuring “discretion/inﬂuence” is a matter of informed judgment
by experts.
Taken together Variables 2, 3 and 4 try to get to the heart of “ﬁscal incoherence”.
Fiscal incoherence occurs when those who decide on expenditures know that they
will be paid for by others.  They are encouraged to behave irresponsibly.
Furthermore, voter-taxpayers will also encourage their local authorities to behave
irresponsibly, since they too like the idea that others will pay for their collective
goods.  Fiscal incoherence leads to ﬁscal illusion (collective goods are costless).
We take it as given that fiscal coherence (tax revenue is spent in the same
constituency as it is raised) induces a more responsible form of government, and
gives taxpayers a better price/quality trade-off for the supply of collective goods.
All things equal, it should result in a lower ratio of taxes to GDP.
Table 4: Local discretionary spending power
Rank
5 Lower levels of government possess real autonomy, must meet expenditure 
largely from own taxes,  few transfers from higher levels of government
4 Lower levels of government exercise a wide measure of spending autonomy
but depend on central government for part of their budget (< 20%)
3 Lower levels of government exercise a wide measure of autonomy, despite 
depending on central government for a large part of their budget (> 20%)
2 Central state determines tasks, sets global limits to expenditure, local 
spending fairly free within these constraints
1 Central state determines tasks, leaving lower level with little or no discretion
0 No local power, all is centralised 
Variable 5: legal rights of tax payers 
Tax litigation:  what legal protection do taxpayers enjoy?  Do the tax authorities
enjoy special privileges, do people have to address themselves to special
administrative courts, or can they seek redress through the normal courts?
This variable seeks to discover if the rule of law applies to tax matters. Tax payers
need to have easy access to independent local courts if they ﬁnd themselves in
conﬂict with the tax authorities.  At the other end of the scale we have a distant,
centralised tax authority with exceptional coercive powers at its disposal.  Special
administrative courts run by the tax authority itself are highly suspect, which is
why we prefer ﬁscal litigation to go through the normal court procedure.    This is
more common in Anglo-Saxon countries than on the Continent.
8
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Table 5: Legl rights of taxpayers
Rank
5 Tax authorities enjoy no privilege.  The case goes to court in the ordinary 
way
4 Administrative courts exist at each level, but tax payer can appeal to 
ordinary courts 
3 Administrative courts exist, ﬁscal authorities decisions can be challenged, 
but tax payer must pay up anyway, pending the judgment
2 Litigation is managed by the tax authority itself, decisions have immediate 
effect, tax payer can appeal only after the internal litigation process has run 
its course
1 There is no right of appeal outside the administrative courts
0 There are no administrative courts, tax payers have no rights at all
Stage 2:
Establishing quantitative estimates for various elements of the working
deﬁnition of ﬁscal decentralisation.
Upon the invitation of IREF, twelve scholars agreed to assess ﬁfteen countries in
the light of the above variables and score cards.  These papers are available on the
IREF web site11. Each scholar or team produced its own study, emphasizing
whatever was most relevant for each country or countries, but keeping to the
overall framework.  The authors of this methodological paper then used the
country studies in order to extract the detailed information needed to develop the
index.  The methodology, score cards and scores were discussed by the IREF
group at a seminar held in Aix-en-Provence on 13 May 2003.  Various adjustments
having been agreed upon by the group, the ﬁnal scores may not match exactly the
initial scores as presented in the web versions of the papers.
11 Iref web site: www.iref-europe.org/fra/indexfr.htm
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4. Interpreting the Results and further Questions
Index of Fiscal Decentralisation:  unweighted average of scores earned by each
country for 5 variables: 
Table 6: Average 5 variables, 15 countries
Switzerland 4.0 Slovakia 2.4
Denmark 3.0 Spain 2.3
Italy 3.0 Slovenia 2.2
Sweden 2.8 Czech Rep 1.9
Germany 2.6 UK 1.8
Poland 2.6 France 1.7
Norway 2.5 Ireland 1.3
Hungary 2.5 Average 2.44
0
0,5
1
1,5
2
2,5
3
3,5
4
Average
Switzerland
Denmark
Sweden
Germany
Poland
Italy
Norway
Czech Rep
Spain
Slovakia
Slovania
Hungary
UK
France
Ireland
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Our study has not provided much evidence on the question of the effects of ﬁscal
competition.  The over-all level of centralisation is high for most countries, and
decentralisation moves are comparatively recent, suggesting that only Switzerland
has any experience in ﬁscal competition at sub-national level.  International ﬁscal
competition is still in its infancy so more time is needed to assess its effects.  In the
meantime, Curzon Price points out in the paper on Switzerland12 (in this volume)
that inter-cantonal ﬁscal competition (of long standing) has not resulted in a “race
to the bottom” and  Brosio13 notes that, in the admittedly recent Italian experience,
provinces have used their new-found freedom to raise, rather than to lower, taxes. 
There may be a positive relationship between our index of ﬁscal decentralisation
and per capita income:  thus Switzerland, Denmark, Sweden and Germany (at the
top end of the scale) enjoy higher per capita incomes than France, Italy and the UK
(at the bottom end of the scale).  Italy’s high score should be ignored since it
reﬂects recent reforms which will take decades to translate into per capita income
results, if any.  The Central European Countries being still in a transitional mode,
are not yet in a comparable position either.  However, the relationship is not very
strong and more country studies and possibly time series are needed to explore the
relationship further.
There is no simple relationship between our index of ﬁscal decentralisation and
the share of government in the economy.  Thus Ireland (a highly centralized
unitary state) enjoys one of the lowest tax to GDP ratios (31.1%) in the set, while
Sweden (a rather decentralized unitary state) enjoys one of the highest (54.2%).
While this result runs counter the hypothesis that decentralisation per se encourages
greater taxpayer control over government, it does not contradict the hypothesis that
ﬁscal incoherence encourages irresponsible government.  It is of course possible that
these different outcomes reflect voter preferences as to the size of government, in
which case it would be folly to try to harmonize them at EU level.
Combining variables 2 and 4 (see matrix below) puts the emphasis on fiscal
redistribution and the strength of the link between taxing and spending decisions.
It is clear from most individual country papers that the trend is towards entrusting
lower levels of government with ever more tasks to perform, even if central
government does not easily relinquish its sovereign taxing powers.  This means
that, other things equal, there is a growing measure of tax redistribution from the
centre to sub-national levels of government, and increasing ﬁscal incoherence.
It is difficult to interpret this trend, however.  On the one hand, it favours greater
efﬁciency since many public goods are best delivered at local level.  It suggests that
the economies of scale argument for the provision of public goods is no longer
dominant and that the public is willing to trade in economies of scale for more
transparency, efﬁciency and control over how their tax money is spent.  On the other
hand, it favours greater inefﬁciency in the supply and demand for public goods, since
12 Curzon-Price-2003.
13 Brosio-2003.
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the link between taxing and spending decisions is weakened and government taxing
and spending irresponsibility may be encouraged.   However, this situation may be
just a phase in a process leading to coherent decentralisation in the long run.  For the
time being, however, ﬁscally coherent states (whether unitary or federal) are a deﬁnite
minority in our sample.
Variable 2: Central/ local tax power
Highly centralized Highly 
decentralized
Highly centralized Fiscally coherent Empty box
Variable 4 centralized unitary 
Central/local states
Spending (UK, Ireland)
power
discretion &
inﬂuence Highly decentralized Fiscally incoherent Fiscally coherent 
unitary or federal decentralisation
states
(Nordic countries Switzerland
Germany, France) Italy?
Table 7: Fiscal Coherence
Fiscally incoherent states (Nordic countries, Germany, France) appear to
have a higher ratio of tax to GDP than fiscally coherent states (UK, Ireland,
Switzerland), which confirms the hypothesis that fiscal incoherence encourages
irresponsibility,  but more countries need to be added to the sample before any
stronger conclusions can be reached.  Although we feel that the transition countries
cannot be directly compared with the older industrialized market economies in this
regard, we note that they have adopted the Nordic model (they are ﬁscally incoherent
unitary states) and may therefore soon join the ranks of the high tax to GDP ratio
countries before very long (if the irresponsibility hypothesis turns out to be dominant).
However, like Ireland, they appear to be very much aware of the benefits of
international ﬁscal competition, which may keep taxes down at least for a while.
More generally we would argue that “coherent decentralisation” (last box in
the matrix, occupied only by Switzerland, and perhaps Italy) might be the answer to
the growing disaffection of people with politics and politicians.  It is arguably the only
answer to the growing “democratic deﬁcit” in the European Union, itself open to the
pressures of globalisation and the need to remain ﬁscally competitive with the rest of
the world.  It could lead the way to “decentralized globalization”, whereby people
regain control, at the local level, of the principal decisions concerning the ﬁnancing
and provision of social and semi-public goods, leaving only a few true public goods to
12
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be supplied at a higher level.   Coherent decentralisation could also be the answer to
the responsible delivery of social and semi-public goods, important in determining the
location of ever more mobile entrepreneurs and factors of production.  
There is no clear relationship between the size of countries and their degree of
centralisation:  Switzerland is a very small, very decentralized country, the UK a large,
very centralized country; but then we have in our sample a large federal state
(Germany) and several small unitary states (Ireland, the Nordic countries, the Central
European countries).  All are, of course, democracies.  But it is clear that they are
democracies of a very different kind.  That small countries like Slovenia and Ireland
should be so centralized is perhaps more acceptable from a democratic point of view
than the centralisation of large countries like the UK or France. Normalizing for
population, the “democratic deﬁcit” appears rather large in these countries, and it is
doubtless because of this that all large unitary states are exploring ways of devolving
power to local authorities.  Italy is particularly striking.  It is at present undergoing a
major decentralisation exercise, while the UK has made a timid start with the Welsh
Assembly and the Scottish and Northern Irish Parliaments, and  France has for many
years been moving towards “régionalisation” (or “décentralisation” or
“déconcentration”).  As noted above, growing ﬁscal incoherence may be just a phase
in the process of transition towards a more coherent form of decentralized
government.  Indeed, there is much to be said for completing the process and some
societies may adopt coherent decentralisation in the long run.  This is certainly what
the electorate would wish for and would constitute a further chapter in Acton’s History
of Freedom, were it ever to occur.14
The range of different models of government is striking in itself and suggests that it
would be very difficult, not to say impossible, to harmonize all taxes across
Europe.  By the same token, it would be self-defeating to harmonize only one or
two types of tax (say, corporate tax, or tax on savings), since governments would
have a hundred ways of compensating by changing other taxes, thus pushing tax
dispersion into other areas.
Part of the redistribution of taxes from the centre to local levels of
government is inspired by regional policy.  Richer regions are expected to support
poorer regions, to some degree, within the nation state.  There is also a
redistributive regional policy at European level (comparatively much smaller).
However, the trend noted by all authors towards greater local autonomy is
precisely aimed at reducing the extent of this type of redistribution, political
support for which has long been waning, even within the conﬁnes of the nation
state, since the effects appear to be at best negligible, at worst, wasteful and
corrupting.   However, looking to the future, with ten new much poorer members
joining, the pressure to up-grade and enhance regional redistribution policies at
European level is bound to increase.  Which of these two very contradictory trends
will dominate?
14 Op. Cit.
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Our study decided to exclude social transfers, but it is clear that any future
elaboration of our study of fiscal decentralisation would need to look into how
social goods are ﬁnanced and produced.
Even the highly centralizing Constitutional Treaty Project does not alter the
basic European rule that all matters concerning taxation must be taken
unanimously.  The proposed Directive on Taxation of Savings (DTS) (to enter into
force only once all international agreements upon which it depends have been
ratiﬁed) has been many years in the making.  This illustrates the political difﬁculty
of reaching even a minimal agreement on one speciﬁc tax.  It is not just that 15
(now 25) countries must agree.  There are also international repercussions.  These
were particularly clear in the case of the DTS, since if income from savings was to
be taxed at a uniform level throughout the EU, money would just ﬂow to other
ﬁnancial centres outside the EU.  This problem, far from resolved even for the DTS
(after much arduous diplomacy), is in fact much more general.  Even supposing
the EU could agree on a harmonized tax code, it would have to be able to adjust to
the reality of international competition.  It would be disastrous if, once a
harmonized rate were set in stone (given the internal political difficulties of
achieving agreement), it could never be changed again.  This would be an
invitation to the rest of the world to set taxes below EU levels, ensuring that mobile
resources move to their areas.  The only answer would be to give the EU clear
fiscal competence to change tax rates.  But this implies far greater democratic
control at EU level, unthinkable in present circumstances.  In short, fiscal
harmonization, even if desirable (and this is by no means clear), is at present quite
impossible.
We are therefore obliged to entertain the very real probability of ﬁscal competition
within the EU, and between the EU and the rest of the world, for the foreseeable
future.  This competition will take two basic forms.  Mobile factors (capital, ﬁrms,
savings) will move geographically from high to low tax areas, and we can expect
some spontaneous convergence to lower tax rates on this account (though much
has already occurred).  What is less apparent, however, is that geographically
immobile factors (labour, land) will also move functionally from high to low tax
alternatives available in the same geographic space (from employment onto
welfare, from the market to “do-it-yourself” production, from the official to the
undeclared economy, or simply from active to non-active roles in the economy).
In short, countries will be competing on both fronts, both to attract geographically
mobile resources to their shores, and to encourage a high participation rate for
geographically immobile resources.  Countries will therefore find it difficult to
compensate lower corporate and savings taxes with higher taxes on labour and
land.  
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APPENDIX I
COUNTRY RESULTS, SUMMARY FINDINGS FOR EACH VARIABLE
The methodology, score cards and scores were discussed by the IREF group of
researchers15 at a seminar held in Aix-en-Provence on 13 May 2003.  Various
adjustments having been agreed upon by the group, the final scores may not
match exactly the initial scores as presented in the web version of the papers.
Country results, variable 1
Central/local split in tax revenues
Switzerland 3.5 Hungary 1
Denmark 2 Norway 1
Germany 1.5 Czech Republic 1
Sweden 1.5 Slovenia 1
Poland 1.5 Slovakia 0.5
Spain 1.5 UK 0.5
France 1.5 Ireland 0
Italy 1.5 Average 1.3
The results for this variable show how centralized tax collection in most
countries is.  Even Switzerland, by far the most decentralized, does not earn more
than 3.5.   It suggests that there is a widespread perception that there are
economies of scale in tax collection.  This may beis surely changing with electronic
data processing, which massively reduces the transaction costs of raising taxes for
all levels of government.   If so, there may be hope for “coherent decentralisation”
in the future (see Introduction and Conclusion of this paper)16.
Country results, variable 2
central/local tax discretion
Switzerland 4 UK 1.5
Denmark 3 Czech Republic 1
Sweden 3 Spain 1
Italy 3 Poland 1
Germany 2 Slovakia 0.5
Norway 2 Slovania 0,5
France 2 Ireland 0
Hungary 2 Average 1.77
15 See www.iref-europe.org/fra/indexfr.htm for the country studies upon which these
evaluations are based.
16 See Introduction and Conclusion of this paper.
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Results for Variable 2 show that although local governments in most
countries get to spend between 20-50% of total public revenue, they do not enjoy
real discretionary spending power. This is because with central government grants
come, naturally enough, close central government controls to try to combat local
government fiscal irresponsibility. So most tasks are set from above, with the
exception of Switzerland.  If, as is the case in Sweden, the administration of tax
collection is decentralized, we feel that this does not reﬂect so much a respect for
local democracy, but rather a desire to control tax-payers more efﬁciently17.  Italy’s
high ranking reﬂects fundamental constitutional reforms introduced in 1998.
Country results, Variable 3
Local discretionary taxing power
Switzerland 4 Slovakia 2.5
Sweden 3.5 Czech Republic 1.5
Denmark 3 Ireland 1.5
Germany 3 Hungary 1
Spain 3 France 1
Italy 3 Slovenia 1
Poland 2.5 UK 1
Norway 2.5 Average 2.27
Results for variable 3 show that some Scandinavian countries, without
having a formal federal structure, nevertheless enjoy a large measure of local
autonomy to set taxes.  The two big unitary states – France and the UK are at the
other end of the scale.  It should be noted that Italy, formerly a unitary state, is in
the process of radically changing its constitution and government structures, a fact
which is reﬂected in its score (3).  On the other hand, it is judged that the creation
of the Scottish and Welsh elected bodies has not (yet) fundamentally altered the
very centralized nature of the UK.
Country results, Variable 4
Local discretionary spending power
Switzerland 4.5 Slovakia 3
Denmark 4 Hungary 3
Spain 3.5 Germany 2.5
Slovenia 3.5 France 2
Italy 3.5 Czech Republic 1
Sweden 3 UK 1
Poland 3 Ireland 0
Norway 3 Average 2.7
That Switzerland and Germany should earn high scores on this variable is
17 See detailed comments by Norgaard/Braestrup, p. 31.
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not surprising, but it is interesting that a lot of countries, even without a formal
federal structure, are organized along lines which give local government a wide
measure of autonomy determined along lines of “European” subsidiarity (i.e.,
devolved, top-down subsidiarity).  This is better than nothing (see Ireland and the
UK, for example).  Slovenia’s 1993 Local Self-government Act appears to have
transferred major powers to local government.  In Italy, provincial and municipal
governments have used their important new fiscal powers to raise, rather than
lower, taxes. As a result Rome is trying to set limits on these new powers18.
Variable 5
Legal rights of tax payers
Slovenia 5 Norway 4
Poland 5 Italy 4
Slovakia 5 Germany 4
Hungary 5 Denmark 3.5
Czech Republic 5 Sweden 3
UK 5 Spain 2.5
Ireland 5 France 2
Switzerland 4 Average 4.13
Most countries give citizens a very high level of legal protection from the tax
authorities, especially the Scandinavian and Anglo Saxon countries.  Central
European countries are keen to break with the past.  Only France and Spain seem
to still have problems with their Napoleonic and/or monarchic past.
18 Brosio, pp. 13-14.
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APPENDIX II
DETAILED EXPLANATION FOR COUNTRY SCORES
Germany
Prof. Lars P. Feld, 
Philipps-University Marbourg
Variable 1 Structure of budget receipts:  Central/local split
About 30% of Germany’s taxes are levied locally (see OECD 2002b, Country studies
UK 2001-02, Graph 30) but länder and municipal governments account for almost
60% of expenditures19). However, this variable only considers tax revenues, and
on this account, according to the standard score card, Germany gets 1.5.
Variable 2 measure of ﬁscal autonomy, ﬁscal sovereignty and democratic
answerability
This variable assesses ﬁscal autonomy and responsibility.  Länder and municipal
governments account for almost 60% of expenditures20.  This places Germany in
an ambiguous position.  Although expenditure is very decentralized, the extent of
redistribution between levels of government suggests reduced responsibility to
“stand on one’s own feet”.  Feld asserts in this regard “La peréquation ﬁscale entre
les fédérés complète l’impression que le fédéralisme coopératif allemand est un
système très inefficace”21.  So despite its federal structure and legendary fiscal
decentralisation, we believe that Germany scores no more than 2.5.
Variable 3 which level of government is responsible for tax legislation, tax
rates, tax structure?
Germany possesses a classical federal structure, with each level of government
enjoying a wide measure of self-determination.  However, the federal level holds
the ultimate power at least as far as taxation is concerned, and may determine
expenditure in areas of shared competence22, or may assert new competencies.
As Feld says: “Les fédérés gèrent souvent des administrations à la place de l’Etat
19 Feld, p. 1. The pages mentionned in this appendix are those of each paper presented at
the IREF web site ; www.iref-europe.org/fra/indexfr.ht
20 Feld, p. 10.
21 Feld, p. 28.
22 Feld, p. 11.
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fédéral”23 and cites the case of kindergartens : the Federal government imposes on
the Lander the duty to provide a place for every child, and then may (or may not!)
help to pay for it.  Feld also notes that municipalities have a fair measure of
autonomy to set business tax24.  In short, Germany fits the model of devolved
subsidiarity and scores 3.
Variable 4 Spending decisions:  How is spending decided upon? Managed?
Monitored?
How is spending decided upon?  According to Feld “la structure des dépenses des
collectivités allemandes est souvent prédéterminée par les autres collectivités”25.
Or again : « La structure de dépenses est ﬁxée par des élus nationaux et régionaux
dans les législatives fédérales ou dans les négociations centralisées »26.  This
suggests that Germany again scores 2.5.
Variable 5 Tax disputes and litigation (what legal rights do tax payers
enjoy?)
According to Feld “Les contentieux fiscaux sont portés devant des instances
administratives en cas de contentieux moins sérieux et devant des instances
judiciaires spécialisées en cas de contentieux plus sérieux.  Dans le dernier cas les
tribunaux financiers s’occupent des contentieux fiscaux nationaux, régionaux et
locaux. »27.  Pending further information, and assuming that tax payers have the
ultimate right to take their case through normal courts, Germany scores 4.
Germany’s unweighted average score is 2.6.
Switzerland
Prof. Victoria Curzon Price
University of Geneva
Assisted by Andrea CUOMO
University of Geneva
Variable 1 Structure of budget receipts:  Central/local split
In Switzerland, the Federal government raised 32% of all taxes in 2000 (Curzon
PriceTable 2).  This share has been growing slowly but surely (it stood at 28% in
1975).  Excluding social charges, the three-way split in in total tax revenues in 2000
was: Federal 39%, Cantonal 37% and municipal 24%.  Combining the two, we
23 Ibid., p. 11
24 Taxe professionnelle, pp. 22-ss.
25 Ibid., p. 38. 
26 Ibid., p. 38.
27 Ibid., p.36, et T.15. 
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consider that Switzerland scores 3.5 on this variable.  The score would be even
higher if we took into consideration the fact that the Cantonal government collect
personal and corporate income taxes on behalf of the Federal government.
Variable 2 measure of ﬁscal autonomy, ﬁscal sovereignty and democratic
answerability
Fiscal sovereignty resides with the Cantons28, and even the Communes have a
wide measure of autonomy. This fact earns Switzerland a score of 4 : “Taxes levied
autonomously at each level (little inter-regional redistribution)”.    
Variable 3 which level of government is responsible for tax legislation, tax
rates, tax structure?
Given Switzerland’s highly decentralized tax structure and citizens’ rights to initiate
referenda on all matters, especially including tax questions, we consider that a
score of 4 is appropriate (“Each level of government is independent of the other(s).
Referenda are possible.”):  However, it should be noted that in 1990 Switzerland
adopted a federal law on the harmonisation of tax bases29.  which constrains
cantonal freedom to determine tax structures. However, since tax rates are not
harmonized, we consider that this is but a small dent in cantonal ﬁscal authority.
Score: 4.
Variable 4 Spending decisions:  How is spending decided upon?
Managed? Monitored?
How is spending decided upon? We consider that a score of 4.5 is appropriate here.
Variable 5 Tax disputes and litigation (what legal rights do tax payers
enjoy?)
Same as Germany:  Specialized administrative courts settle most questions, but
citizens may carry cases up the normal court system as far as they wish.  Score 4.
Switzerland’s unweighted average score is 4.0.1
28 Curzon Price, p. 1.
29 Not rates,  see Curzon Price, p. 4.
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Spain
Prof. Joachim TRIGO
University of Barcelona
Variable 1 Structure of budget receipts:  Central/local split
Lower levels of government raise less than 20% of all taxes30 (see OECD 2002b,
Country studies UK 2001-02, Graph 30), , but spend almost 30%.  Trigo conﬁrms
this state of affairs31 and suggests a score of 2.5.  However, this seems on the high
side, given our standard score card and the fact that Trigo32 appears to be saying
that provincial governments raised only 7% of total income tax.  Our score card
suggests a score of 1 – but this may be too low.  Spain is only just beginning to
experiment with federalism, and clearly retains many unitary institutions from the
past.  Trigo speaks of a recent reform, adopted in July 2001, which aims to make
“the incomes of the CCAA depend more on the taxes paid by its citizens and less
on the transfers of the State”33, but no evaluation of this reform is available yet.
We suggest a score of 1.5.
Variable 2 (measure of ﬁscal autonomy and democratic answerability)
Pending the results of the July 2001 reform, Spain still appears to be highly
centralized. Trigo suggests that 80% of all tax revenues are decided upon by the
central government34 and suggests a score of 1.
Variable 3  (measure of legislative responsibility for setting taxes)
Trigo considers35 that the score of 3 corresponds precisely to Spain’s situation
(“Powers of each level set in the Constitution according to the “European” model
of devolved subsidiarity”).  We agree.  
Variable 4 (who decides on spending?)
Trigo refers to “autonomy, sufﬁciency and solidarity”36– somewhat contradictory
principles –  and later to “insufﬁcient autonomy in the decision of the structure of
the spending of the CCAA … which cannot make its resources available as a
whole, and establish its priorities of spending according to the decisions of its
30 OECD 2002b, Graph 30.
31 See Trigo, p. 38.
32 Ibid., p. 18.
33 Ibid., p. 18.
34 Ibid., p. 38.
35 Ibid., p. 39.
36 Ibid., p. 15.
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Parliament in those areas that are of its responsibility”37.  A whole section is
devoted to “The low level of ﬁscal responsibility”38.  For these reasons we believe
that Spain earns a score of no more than 3, perhaps 3.5 (“Distribution of tasks
between levels of government is established by higher authority”).
Variable 5 (What jurisdictions for tax litigation?)
According to Trigo39 tax payers have “to answer to the sovereign Tax
Administration, which in principle is the State, despite the fact that responsibilities
exist which …have been yielded to the Autonomous Communities”.  He suggests a
score of 2.5 which we agree to.
Spain’s unweighted average score is 2.3.
United Kingdom
Prof. Victoria Curzon Price
University of Geneva
Variable 1 (Structure of budget receipts)
According to the OECD40, local governments in the UK raise a very small fraction
of tax revenue (less than 5%), and get to spend about 25% of the total.   Data
derived from the IMF GFS give a somewhat different result (local government
expenditure rises to 30% of the total (with social security excluded) (Curzon Price,
Table 8).  Since the Thatcher government’s ill-fated attempt to reform local
ﬁnances, local governments have had their taxing powers reduced41.  They can
only levy household property taxes, business property taxes now being the
preserve of the central government.  They have no other ﬁscal source of revenue.
This state of affairs would seem to justify a score of 0.5
Variable 2 (measure of ﬁscal autonomy and democratic answerability)
Local governments in the UK are basically agents of the central government, which
sets the agenda with regard to education, social services, housing, law and order
and support for industry42.  These items account for 82% of local government
expenditure43, leaving interest on local government debt (8%), transport (4.8%),
37 Ibid., p. 16.
38 Ibid., pp. 17-19.
39 Ibid., p. 39.
40 OECD-2002b, Graph 30.
41 Curzon Price, pp. 7-9.
42 Curzon Price, p. 2.
43 Curzon Price, Table 5.
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recreation & sport (3%) and “other” public services (4%) for possible local
autonomy.  Local governments are in competition with “quangos” (quasi-
autonomous non-governmental bodies” which also execute central government
policy in such areas as agriculture, transport, environment, social services,
education and health44.  The creation of the Scottish Parliament and Welsh
Assembly in 1998 does not alter this state of affairs, since these new elected bodies
have taken over the tasks formerly performed by Whitehall, without altering the
nature of local government.  These bodies now have a say in how to spend £21 bn
of public money (out of a total of £312 bn, or less than 10%).  According to the
standard score card, the UK scores 1 (“Taxes determined by central authority, local
“spending power” =/<20%”), but we would suggest 1.5 to reﬂect the creation of the
Scottish and Welsh representative bodies (even if they don’t have much power).
Variable 3  (measure of legislative responsibility for setting taxes)
We believe that the UK scores 1. 
Variable 4 (who decides on spending?)
The UK appears to score 1 on this variable.
Variable 5 (What jurisdictions for tax litigation?)
This is the only variable for which the UK has a high score, because the British
legal system does not have “special” administrative courts.  If the Crown decides to
prosecute an individual, the Director of Public Prosecutions has to address the
normal court system.  If an individual wants to appeal against the state, he must do
the same.  Most cases are, of course, settled out of court through negotiation.
Score: 5  “Tax authorities enjoy no privileges.  The case goes to court in the
ordinary way”.
The UK’s unweighted average score is 1.8.
France
Dr. Olivier VERHEYDE
Université Aix-Marseille III
Variable 1 (Structure of budget receipts)
Central government in France levies 66% of total revenues45, or perhaps 60%46.
This proportion rises if one takes into account only ﬁscal receipts, of which the
44 Curzon Price, p. 3.
45 Verheyde, p. 15, T.1.
46 Verheyde, p. 31.
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central government raises 90%47.   These data are rather contradictory because
France retains a great many specific, non-fiscal levies (on rents, on share
transactions, on business turnover etc.).  We suggest a compromise score of 1.5
Variable 2 (measure of ﬁscal autonomy and democratic answerability)
After describing the structure of tax legislation in France (highly centralized)
Verheyde48 nevertheless maintains that local governments enjoy a reasonable level
of autonomy “La marge de manoeuvre ﬁscale locale est ... assez forte en France”49
because they cover at least 50% of total expenditure with their own taxes50.  This
appears to earn France a score of 2, even though Verheyde notes51 that only
agents of the central state actually levy taxes. However, local governments then
receive back from the central government what they have determined, as well as
about double that in extra grants. 
(Please refer to the problem of how to attribute taxes note 6 above). 
Variable 3  (measure of legislative responsibility for setting taxes)
Local governments are responsible for setting rates covering half their expenditure,
as we have just seen, which itself is equal to 25% of the total52.  But they cannot
“invent” new taxes.   This seems to earn a score of 1.
Variable 4 (who decides on spending?)
Verheyde53 reports that local governments in France are forbidden to do certain
things (like support churches), and are obliged to do others (like maintain school
buildings), but that if a municipal council is well run, it can enjoy a fair amount of
discretion between these two extremes.  Score 2 seems to apply here.
Variable 5 (What jurisdictions for tax litigation?)
Verheyde gives a score of 2 without hesitation, but notes an additional difﬁculty for
the tax-payer:  depending on type of tax at issue, a specialized examining
magistrate may be assigned to the case without the tax payer being aware of which
person (or which branch of the judiciary) is judging his case54.
47 See OECD 2002b, Graph 30.
48 Verheyde, pp. 1-15.
49 Verheyde, p. 21.
50 Ibid., pp. 22-23.
51 Ibid., p. 31.
52 Verheyde, p. 31)
53 Ibid., p. 32.
54 Ibid., p. 33.
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Central Europe
Andras SEMJEN
Institute of Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences
Laszlo SZAKADAT
Department of Microeconomics
Budapest University of Economics and Public Administration
Czech Republic
Variable 1 (Structure of budget receipts)
According to the IMF Government Finance Statistics (GFS), the local government
share in consolidated government revenue of the Czech Republic, minus social
security receipts, is about 23%.    According to the score card, this gives CR a score
of  just over 1.
Variable 2 (measure of ﬁscal autonomy and democratic answerability)
S&S report p. 11 that “tax revenues of subnational governments varied between 40-
53%” and the following paragraphs suggest that indeed, while local governments
may raise very little in taxes, they get to spend about half of total public revenues.
There is a substantial amount of redistribution from central to local government,
along with which comes, of course, strict central control.  “In the CR municipalities
and other subnational governments have very limited power to tax and
accordingly their autonomy in the decision over expenditures is also weak”55.
This looks like a score of 1.
Variable 3  (measure of legislative responsibility for setting taxes)
By the same token, a score of 1.5 seems to ﬁt the CR.  
Variable 4 (who decides on spending?)
The story told pp.11-14 suggests a score of 1perhaps 2.5:
Variable 5 (What jurisdictions for tax litigation?)
We believe that a score of 5 would be appropriate here56
Unweighted average score for the Czech Republic is 1.9.
55 S&S, p. 11
56 S&S Table 3.4.
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Hungary
Variable 1 (Structure of budget receipts)
IMF GFS suggest that local government in Hungary raises about 33% of total
revenue.  This seems to earn Hungary a score of 1.5.
Variable 2 (measure of ﬁscal autonomy and democratic answerability)
“local taxes are administered and collected by local governments” but “tax sharing”
in both directions is an important factor.57.  This suggests a fair measure of
democratic accountability, but too much redistribution to earn 3.  We suggest a
score of 2.
Variable 3  (measure of legislative responsibility for setting taxes)
“Taxes can only be imposed in Hungary if they are listed in tax codes.  No taxes
can be levied without legislative approval.  Even local taxes are limited in this
respect... The tax code determines not only the tax base of municipalities but... the
upper limits of tax rates as well...”58
This seems to warrant a score of 1.
Variable 4 (who decides on spending?)
“... in many important respects local communities have some autonomy”59, but
local government is chronically under-financed  (central government sets tasks
which afterwards it fails to pay for...).  The Hungarian situation seems to ﬁt the
score of 3.
Variable 5 (What jurisdictions for tax litigation?)
According to S&S60 , 5 is appropriate here.
The unweighted average score for Hungary is 2.56.
57 S&S, p. 14.
58 S&S,  p. 14.
59 S&S,  p. 18
60 T 3.4
27
Price and Garello: Index of Fiscal Decentralisation: Methodology and Findings
Poland
Variable 1 (Structure of budget receipts)
According to IMF/GFS, local share in consolidated public revenue (minus social
security receipts) amounts to 28% .  This corresponds to a score of 1.5
Variable 2 (measure of ﬁscal autonomy and democratic answerability)
“The Polish tax system is administered by the Minister of Finance... most taxes are
administered and collected by the Polish state”61.  This suggests a score of 1.
Variable 3  (measure of legislative responsibility for setting taxes)
Taxes can only be levied on the basis of tax codes and amendments passed by the
Polish Parliament62 – normally earning Poland a score of 1.   However, “Citizens at
local level may initiate referenda on fiscal matters”, which is an interesting
democratic control mechanism.  The ﬁscal referendum earns Poland a score of 3. 
Variable 4 (who decides on spending?)
“In 1998 when the Polish government decentralized ... the ﬁnancial control over
local government was also loosened a bit.  The subnational governments now
have more inﬂuence on expenditures ... the functions were reallocated among the
three levels of governmental system”63.  This suggests a score of 3 (classical
subsidiarity)
Variable 5 (What jurisdictions for tax litigation?)
Again, we defer to S&S and give a score of 564
The unweighted average score for Poland is 2.6. 
61 S&S, p. 21.
62 S&S, p. 21.
63 S&S, p. 29.
64 S&S, T.3.4.
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Slovakia
Variable 1 (Structure of budget receipts)
IMF GFS gives local governments’ share in total revenue as equal to 13%.  This
suggests a score of 0.5
Variable 2 (measure of ﬁscal autonomy and democratic answerability)
Local tax revenues cover only 50% of total local expenditure  “Many functions of
the general government are directly financed from the central budget and not
through local governments” which implies a “relatively high level of centralized
financing”65.  However, under-financing of local government is a problem:
“Municipalities started to sell their tangible and intangible assets in order to ﬁnance
their tasks” ... “Municipalities are usually poor”  All of which suggests a low score –
perhaps 0.5:
Variable 3  (measure of legislative responsibility for setting taxes)
As in Poland, Parliament is the sole source of tax law, but local referenda are
possible66
Variable 4 (who decides on spending?)
A system of “autonomous local governments” was established in “late 1990”67...
“intermediary administrative units were also created” (such as districts).  S&S imply
that local government in Slovakia is similar to that elsewhere in the region, which
suggests a compromise score of 2.5, possibly 3.
Variable 5 (What jurisdictions for tax litigation?)
Again, a score of 5 (see above)
The unweighted average score for Slovakia is 2.4.
65 S&S, p. 36.
66 S&S, p. 36.
67 S&S, p. 35.
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Slovenia
Variable 1 (Structure of budget receipts)
According to IMF GFS, local government in Slovenia raises 17% of the totoal.  This
corresponds to a score of 1 (17 being closer to 20 than to 10).
Variable 2 (measure of ﬁscal autonomy and democratic answerability)
“The tax system is administered by the Minister of Finance and Tax Administration
of the Rep. of Slovenia.... All taxes are collected by central Tax Administration. ...
Citizens at local level may not initiate referenda on ﬁscal matters.”68.  This earns
Slovenia a score of 0.5 on this variable:
Variable 3  (measure of legislative responsibility for setting taxes)
“Taxes can be levied only on the basis of tax code passed and amended by the
Slovene legislation.  Only the Parliament has the right to determine the tax base
and it also sets limits on tax rates.  National and local taxes are determined
centrally.  Local authorities cannot choose freely on what they would like to levy
tax.  They have only a limited choice:  they can ﬁx tax rates within the boundaries
set by the central legislation”.69
However, the system of local ﬁnance was reformed in 199970.  It is not clear if this
reform has substantially shifted tax-and-spend responsibility to municipal level.
Pending further discussion, we suggest a score of 1
Variable 4 (who decides on spending?)
In 1993 Slovenia adopted the Local Self-government Act in accordance with the
European Charter of Local self-government (the right to local self-government
being one of the basic democratic principles promoted by the Council of
Europe)71.  This was a major departure from practice under Communism, when
municipalities simply executed State policy.  So even if Slovenia looks rather
centralised from the tax receipts point of view, it looks decentralized on this
measure:  “the introduction of local self-government resulted in a decentralisation
of the management of public affairs, i.e. transferring numerous tasks of central
government to the local level”  and a large measure of local discretion.
68 S&S, pp. 37-38.
69 S&S, p. 37.
70 S&S, p. 45.
71 S&S, p. 44.
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This score card seems to lack a step between 3 and 4:  Thus tasks can be
distributed constitutionally between different levels of government according to
the “European” model of subsidiarity (3), but the local authority can enjoy a wide
measure of discretion as to how to accomplish these tasks.  Suggest 3.5
Variable 5 (What jurisdictions for tax litigation?)
Same as the other central European countries: 5
Average unweighted score for Slovenia:  2.2
Scandinavia
Stig Norgaard
Danish Ministry of Finance
Jacob Braestrup
Special advisor, Copenhagen City Hall
Both authors are on the board of the Danish Taxpayers Association
Denmark
Variable 1  Structure of budget receipts:  Central/local split
According to N&B, local government raises 34% of total revenue.  This is conﬁrmed
by the OECD, which puts local government revenue at 30%72.  This suggests a
score of 1.5, possibly 2.  IMF GFS suggests a higher share of revenue arising from
local government, but it is not clear that this is net of transfers.  Score: 2
Variable 2 measure of ﬁscal autonomy, ﬁscal sovereignty and democratic
answerability
“All personal taxes ... are calculated by the municipal tax administration... Although
largely state administered, the task of assessing and collecting taxes is thus to some
degree the shared responsibility of the state and municipalities”73.  Score: 3.
Variable 3 : which level of government is responsible for tax legislation,
tax rates, tax structure?
Table 4, p. 15, shows some local tax power.  This suggests that local government in
Denmark cannot blame central government for everything that goes wrong…
Referenda can be initiated by parliamentary representatives, not by the people.
We think that Denmark deserves 3 on this score, even if the score card does not
correspond exactly to the situation described. (subject to discussion with N&B) :
72 See OECD-2002b, Graph 30.
73 N&B, p. 8.
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Variable 4:  Spending decisions:  How is spending decided upon?
Managed? Monitored?
« Most of the responsibilities of local government are dictated by law and thus
mandatory.  Within certain limits counties and municipalities are, however, able to
choose the level of service provided »74.  By analogy with Slovenia, this situation
implies a compromise score of 3.5.  Furthermore, lower levels of governmentThey
have very limited possibility for economically supporting individuals or companies
(id).  The growth of expenditure has been indirectly put under central control by
athe decreed tax-halt75 (the story here suggests that local governments have been
exercizing considerable autonomy until now – perhaps this will now change).  A
centralizing move, but one which limits increases in tax-and-spend policies.
Difﬁcult to interpret.)  We conﬁrm 3.5. 
Variable 5:  Tax disputes and litigation (what legal rights do tax payers
enjoy?)
“If a taxpayer disagrees with the assessment of the local tax administration, he may
appeal free of charge to “Skatteankenaevnet” a locally based layman board of tax
appeal… (this) does not postpone the payment of taxes.  The next step is appeal to
the national tax court.  Then through the normal courts, up to the Supreme Cour”t.
N&B suggest 3, but we think that the fact that the ﬁrst board of appeal is local is a
big plus.  At least 3.5
Unweighted average for Denmark: 3.0
Norway
Variable 1  Structure of budget receipts:  Central/local split
Local government in Norway levies small share of the total:  15%76.  Since we do
not wish to give quarter marks, we suggest that Norway earns a score of 1.
(IMF GFS gives a different answer, but these statistics are ambiguous)
Variable 2 measure of ﬁscal autonomy, ﬁscal sovereignty and democratic
answerability
« In Norway, the administration of tax laws in primarily in the hands of the
national tax authorities, which have the overall responsibility of ensuring that all
taxes are assessed and collected in the correct manner.  The tax authorities also
74 N&B., p. 10.
75 Ibid., p. 13.
76 N&B, p. 20, Chart 6.
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handle the national population register. »77.  THowever, the municipal treasury is
« responsible for the collection and registration of ordinary income taxes and
employers’ payroll taxes » (id).  For this reason we would like to raise Norway’s score
from 1.5 proposed by N&B to 2.  But the high level of central government transfers78
makes for a low level of democratic answerability.  Score: 2For discussion.
Variable 3 : which level of government is responsible for tax legislation,
tax rates, tax structure?
« In Norway, all tax legislation is managed at the state level, by Parliament »79
However, municipal governments have a certain measure of discretion in setting
local tax rates (central government impose a maximum rate of taxation)80
Municipal governments tax both income and property81.  Tax legislation may not
be challenged through referenda82.   We suggest 2.5 (slightly better than N&B’s
score of 2, because of the measure of discretion in setting local tax rates).
Variable 4:  Spending decisions:  How is spending decided upon?
Managed? Monitored?
Central government makes up the considerable shortfall between local revenue
and local expenditure (respectively 15% and 36%83 Chart 6) by a per capita “block
grant”.  One can see why local governments become irresponsible, favour “tax-
and-spend” policies84 which lead to the central government trying to “cap” them.
We agree with N&B that Norway earns a 3 on this variable.
Variable 5:  Tax disputes and litigation (what legal rights do tax payers enjoy?)
“Central tax authorities …are … responsible for tax assessments”85.  First appeal is
to the municipal tax assessment board.  The assessment board is elected by the
members of the municipal council.  There are such tax boards at each level of
government, and appeals can go up and up.  The tax payer may choose to take the
case to the regular courts. (pp. 26-27)”.  Score:  4. 
Unweighted average for Norway: 2.5.
77 N&B, p. 22.
78 Chart 6, p. 20.
79 N&B, p. 24.
80 Ibid.
81 Ibid., p. 25.
82 N&B, p. 26.
83 N&B,  p. 20, Chart 6.
84 N&B, p. 22.
85 N&B, p. 26.
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Sweden
Variable 1  Structure of budget receipts:  Central/local split
Local governments get to raise 30% of public revenue86, a ratio which is conﬁrmed
by the OECD (see OECD 2002b, Country studies UK 2001-02, Graph 30).  This
gives a rank of 1.5.
Rank Central (% revenues) Local (% revenues)  2 60 40  1 80 20  0 100 0  
Variable 2 measure of ﬁscal autonomy, ﬁscal sovereignty and democratic
answerability
« In Sweden the responsibility for tax collection rests in the hands of the National
Tax Board… »87.  But the country is divided into 10 administrative regions, each
administered by a regional tax authority (skattemyndighet).  This must bring the
tax man closer to the people… Each region has a tax fraud investigation unit as
well as an enforcement agency88.  N&B suggest 2, but we wonder if 32.5 is not
more appropriate, given the regional tax administrations
Variable 3 : which level of government is responsible for tax legislation,
tax rates, tax structure?
N&B conﬁrm that « local self-government, including the power of municipalities
and counties to raise taxes in order to ﬁnance local services, is enshrined in the
Swedish constitution »89.  Through the income equalisation component central
government smoothssmoothes out differences between the need for services and
the capacity to provide for them90.  « Personal income (the tax base) is deﬁned by
central government, but municipalities and counties set their own tax rates »91.
Local referenda have been used in an advisory capacity92. 
The general impression is one of considerable local autonomy, but this is
nevertheless tempered by N&B’s informed assessment :
« in reality, it is Parliament who defines the taxing ability of municipalities and
counties » 93 We suggest 3.5.
86 N&B, p. 30, Chart 7.
87 N&B, p. 31.
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid., p. 29.
90 Ibid., p. 33.
91 Ibid., p. 26.
92 Ibid., p. 37.
93 Ibid., p. 37.  
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Variable 4:  Spending decisions:  How is spending decided upon?
Managed? Monitored?
Local governments get to spend 38% of total revenue, and raise 30%,  so there is a
fairly high level of overlap between local tax receipts and local expenditure.  This
implies a high level of local democratic answerability.  N&B conﬁrm that « local
self-government, including the power of municipalities and counties to raise taxes
in order to finance local services, is enshrined in the Swedish constitution »94.
Through the income equalisation component municipalities smooth out
differences between the need for services and the capacity to provide for them95.
Today, the central government provides « block grants » which are not ear-marked
(this increases local government discretionary spending policies)96.  N&B
conclude that « the municipalities and countries of Sweden do enjoy some degree
of budgetary autonomy »97 and suggest a score of 3. 
Variable 5:  Tax disputes and litigation (what legal rights do tax payers
enjoy?)
All legal cases against the public administration, including tax litigation, are
handled by separate administrative courts.  The score card does not really cover
the Swedish situation.  It is not that tax authorities enjoy special legal privileges, it
is simply that the Swedish system distinguishes in general between state and civil
matters.  This is probably designed to enhance the protection of the ordinary
citizen.  We suggest 3.
Average unweighted score for Sweden: 2.8.
Ireland
Dr Graham Brownlow
Lecturer in economics at Dublin City University Business School
Variable 1  Structure of budget receipts:  Central/local split
Ireland has traditionally levied local taxes in the form of property taxes.  These
(always highly unpopular) were abolished in 197898, although a modest residential
property tax (RPT) was reintroduced in 1983 (yielding £7 million out of a total
revenue of £11,716 million)99.  Locally raised public revenue (from RPT, fees for
94 Ibid., p. 29.
95 Ibid., p.33.
96 Ibid., p. 34.
97 Ibid., p. 34.
98 Brownlow, p. 4. 
99 Ibid., p. 3.
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planning applications, rentals, service charges for water, refuse collection, etc.)
amounts to only 4.8% of total revenue (id.).  « Taxes therefore account for only a
small proportion of local revenue » 100.  This gives Ireland a score of 0.  
Variable 2 measure of ﬁscal autonomy, ﬁscal sovereignty and democratic
answerability
« Many empirical studies … all conﬁrm that Ireland has an enduring record of ﬁscal
centalisation »101 leading some commentators  to declare that « the Irish system of
government is subject to a chronic democratic deficit » :  it is neither local nor
government102. Local authorities are funded via central government grants.
Ireland has adopted the American model of local government : professional full-
time local managers (civil servants) run the local authorities in conjunction with
elected representatives103.  Between 1920 and 1993 the number of local councils
was reduced from 460 to 117 in the name of efﬁciency.
« Lower levels of government have no real autonomy »104
We believe that all this implies that on variable 2, Ireland again scores 0.
Variable 3 : which level of government is responsible for tax legislation,
tax rates, tax structure?
By the same token, taxes are decided centrally.  But Ireland has a culture of
referenda105 which has yet to be tested in tax matters.  This mitigating factor
allows us to suggest a score of 1 or 1.5 on this variable.
Variable 4:  Spending decisions:  How is spending decided upon?
Managed? Monitored?
All Brownlow’s comments suggest a very low score.  For instance, p. 26:  “In the
Irish case centralism in both tax raising and spending was very much in force at the
time of the Single European Market in 1992… Ireland’s system of local government
had very limited ﬁnancial autonomy”.106 “The segments for which no real local
autonomy included signiﬁcant areas of Irish economy and society such as:  urban
road transport, ports, airports, agriculture, forestry, fishing, hunting, electricity,
100 Ibid., p. 4.
101 Ibid., p. 3.
102 Ibid., p. 6.
103 Ibid., p. 9.
104 Ibid., p. 10.
105 Ibid., p. 11, 42.
106 Ibid., p. 26. 
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commerce, tourism, security, policy, justice, education, hospitals, personal health
and family welfare services.  The functions that local authorities did carry out in
these areas were in any case very strictly controlled by central government”107.
Variable 5:  Tax disputes and litigation (what legal rights do tax payers
enjoy?)
The legal system follows the Anglo-Saxon model of an independent judiciary with
no special administrative courts.
Score: 5
Unweighted average score for Ireland: 1.3
Italy
Prof. Giorgio BROSIO
Università di Torino
Variable 1 (Structure of budget receipts)
Excluding social security charges, central government in 1999 levied 75% of total
revenue108.  This gives Italy a score of 1.5
However, major decentralisation reforms were introduced in 1993 and 1998 (see
Brosio p.5-7)109 and their effects are reﬂected in the following variables.
Variable 2 (measure of ﬁscal autonomy and democratic answerability)
In 1993 a municipal property tax was introduced, in 1995 regions were granted a
share of the gasoline tax.  In 1998 a new IRAP (VAT) was allotted to the regions
and regional governments were allowed to tax personal incomes at a flat rate
limited to 2%.  In 1999 provinces were given the outcome of the car insurance tax.
Finally, since 2001, regions are getting about 25% of VAT.  These new sources of
income should “allow the richest regions of the North to cover all their present
expenditure responsibilities with taxes”110.
For these reasons we consider that Italy earns a score of 3 (the intent of the reforms
appears to be to oblige regions to “stand on their own feet”.
107 Ibid., p. 26.
108 Brosio,  p. 3.
109 See Brosio, pp. 5-7.
110 Brosio,  p. 6.
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Variable 3  (measure of legislative responsibility for setting taxes)
According to Brosio, the Decreti Bassanini (1998) has introduced “a substantive
amount of administrative federalism” similar to the German model”111.  “The
central government has devolved many of its administrative responsibilities to
regional governments, which in turn have assigned them to still lower levels,
namely provinces and municipalities,” Brosio comments on the “strong resistance”
by central bureaucrats and judges that the regional governments are the big
winners.  This looks like a score of 3 (top-down subsidiarity).
Variable 4 (who decides on spending?)
It is well known that until recently the Italian unitary state transferred substantial
resources from the rich North to the much poorer South.  However, resistance to
this high level of redistribution has grown over time, leading to the Northern
League movement (in favour of regional independence)  and the regional reforms
described by Brosio.  Nevertheless, substantial scope for redistribution still subsists,
and Brosio points to some perverse effects, whereby already rich regions are net
recipients of the system112.   Special statute regions in 1998 covered 78% of
expenditure out of their own taxes, and “ordinary” statute regions covered 52% (up
from 34% and 1.2% respectively in 1981)113.  Brosio concludes his paper by stating
“More responsibilities have been transferred to subnational governments and
central controls have been reduced”  and “A traditionally centralized state is being
gradually transformed into a decentralized one”114.
For these reasons, we suggest a score of 3.5
Variable 5 (What jurisdictions for tax litigation?)
“The Italian system of tax appeals is, first, based on provincial and regional
administrative committees.”  If the dispute is not resolved, both taxpayers and the
tax administration can address the ordinary courts.115
Score 4
Unweighted average score for Italy: 3
111 Brosio, p. 6.
112 Ibid., p. 9.
113 Brosio, Table 5.
114 Ibid., p. 19.
115 Brosio, p. 23.
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